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Abstract
The principal threat most autocratic leaders face stems from within the regime. To con-
trol militaries and mitigate the risk of coups d’etat, many autocratic leaders repeatedly
purge strong officers from the military. What are the causes and consequences of such
purges? Despite its importance, scholars rarely have studied the question, as they have
lacked a systematic and comprehensive dataset. The Military Purges in Dictatorships
(MPD) dataset contains information on the dates and characteristics of 1,007 military
purges, and covers 566 political leaders in 116 authoritarian countries over the period
1965 to 2005. In this article, I describe MPD, compare it with other datasets, present
descriptive statistics on the data, and suggest its applications. By coding the timing
and various characteristics of military purges, MPD facilitates empirical study of the
relationships between autocratic leaders and their militaries, and thus is useful for
researchers studying political violence, repression, civil-military relations, coup-proofing,
leader survival, and regime transition.
Introduction
The principal threat most autocratic leaders face comes from within the regime rather than
from outside. Approximately three-quarters of dictators who lose power do so as the result
of a coup d’etat (Svolik, 2009). To address such threats to their power, many dictators
attempt to control their militaries by eliminating strong potential rivals from key positions
and replacing them with those who are loyal. Prominent examples include Iraq’s Saddam
Hussein, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad and Uganda’s Idi Amin. More recently, Turkey’s Recep
Erdogan and China’s Xi Jinping have increased their political control by purging opponents
in their militaries. An emerging literature on comparative authoritarianism points out that
the repeated elimination of rival elites allows dictators to consolidate their personal power
and diminishes the ability of those elites to hold the dictator accountable (Svolik, 2009;
Sudduth, 2017). In fact, the number of authoritarian regimes where political power is highly
concentrated in the hands of a single individual – typically called personalist dictatorships –
has steadily increased since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz and Wright,
2017; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor., 2017).
What are the causes and consequences of purging the military in autocracies? Despite
its importance, a lack of comprehensive data has impeded systematic research on this topic.
The Military Purges in Dictatorships (MPD) dataset contains systematic human-coded data
on military purges, defined as events in which a political leader within a dictatorial regime
eliminates individuals from their positions in the military or other elements of the security
apparatus. The MPD dataset contains coded information on the dates and characteristics of
military purges covering 566 political leaders in 116 countries under authoritarian regimes
from 1965 to 2005. MPD codes, for example, whether a purge is primarily peaceful, or
involves arresting, jailing or killing military officers, the positions of purged officers, the size
of the purge, and the background reasons for it. Researchers can use MPD in an event data
format as well as a leader-year panel data format. In coding the data, careful attention has
been paid to which leaders conduct purges and, thus, unlike other datasets with country-year
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observations, MPD properly codes cases where multiple leaders ruled in the same year.
This article proceeds as follows. I first overview other datasets that capture some
aspects of political purges, and I highlight important aspects of the MPD dataset that are not
captured elsewhere. Next, I describe how MPD was constructed, and set out the definitions,
data sources, and coding criteria. I then provide descriptive statistics for MPD. I go on to
illustrate how MPD can be used by examining the effects of military purges on the severity
of repression of civilians. The concluding section includes discussion of an agenda for future
research.
Comparison with existing datasets
How can a dictator’s efforts to purge the military be measured? The most comparable dataset
has, perhaps, been provided by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018) (GWF). GWF has several
indicators specifically coded to capture the levels of personalization –defined as concentration
of power in the hands of a leader– within the security apparatus for 280 autocratic regimes
from 1950 to 2010. Their Military Purge variable captures whether regime leaders murder
military or security service opponents, or jail or execute them, either without trial or after
a trial regarded as unfair by country specialists or journalists. Their Military Promotion
variable captures whether there are widespread forced retirements of officers not from a regime
leader’s ethnic or religious group (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2017, pp.30-31).1
Though these variables certainly help us understand the personalization level of the
security apparatus, they do not identify military purge “events” and their timing in a precise
manner. GWF codes each variable as of January 1st for each calendar year, and once a
regime leader is coded as having engaged in personalization activities such as jailing military
officers, the same codes are applied “until the current leader is ousted or the regime ends
unless something you read leads you to believe that the leader’s way of dealing with the
military has changed” (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2017, pp.30-31). In other words, their
data identify the first regime year when a specific personalization policy – including military
1See also Baturo and Elkink (2014) for the measurement of personalism.
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purges– occurs, and all subsequent regime years retain the same coding, such that that leader
is assumed to continue jailing and executing officers until he is ousted or the regime ends
(Song, 2018, p.13). For example, the Military Purge variable is coded as positive during the
entire tenure of Stalin, regardless of actual occurrences of military purges in a particular year.
In contrast, MPD precisely codes the timing of each military purge, regardless of whether a
dictator has engaged in purges in the past.
Several other datasets also capture military purges, but these are limited to particular
types of purge. The dataset on ethnic exclusion created by Roessler (2011) identifies when a
particular ethnic group is excluded from the central government.2 Although the data capture
an important aspect of elite purges, they are limited to those based on ‘ethnicity.’ Yet, even in
countries where ethnicity is politically relevant, ethnic identity is not the only cue for dictators’
decisions about which individuals are potential threats and should be eliminated. The Banks
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive also includes a variable on purges (Banks, 2013),
but is limited to purges based on violence and coercion – namely “jailing and execution.” The
concept of elite purges, however, should not be limited in this way, as nonviolent elimination
can be effective in concentrating power into dictators’ hands. For example, Cameroon’s
Paul Biya repeatedly dismissed his rivals from key positions through nonviolent means and
these efforts are considered to have increased Biya’s control over national defense (Keesing,
May 1986). More fundamentally, the Banks purge variable includes dictators’ acts against
opposition groups outside the regime, without any differentiation of a dictator’s actions to
purge regime insiders. More recently, Easton and Siverson (2018) coded whether a state leader
eliminates and punishes the plotters following a failed coup attempt. The coverage of their
data is therefore limited to the circumstances and periods following failed coup attempts.
MPD builds on the dataset originally used by Sudduth (2017), but has extended it in
several ways. First, it expands the data coverage by coding all autocracies between 1965 and
2005, whereas the original data by Sudduth cover only the period 1969–2003. Second, MPD
2See also Harkness (2016) for her data on leaders’ attempts to build co-ethnic armies.
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introduces several new indicators that are useful in explorations of the dynamics of military
purges. For example, it codes the dates of military purges and lists all the positions targeted
in each, which allows users to ascertain the relative importance of each purge. Another new
feature of MPD is an indicator that identifies whether a purge is primarily violent (including
arresting, jailing, or killing officers), or nonviolent. Third, MPD distinguishes multiple purges
in the same leader-year, while Sudduth’s original dataset aggregated the information for each
leader-year and did not capture the existence of multiple events for the same leader-year.
Finally, as discussed below, my research team and I reexamined the original codings of
Sudduth and updated them if we found her codings to be questionable, or if we found more
relevant information that led us to make changes to the original codings. Thus, the MPD
dataset improves on the quality and reliability of the codings for those cases covered by
Sudduth (2017), while adding new ones for the extended period of coverage.
MPD data: Definitions, coding procedure, variables, and limita-
tions
The MPD dataset contains information on the dates and characteristics of 1,007 military
purges covering 566 political leaders in 116 authoritarian regimes from 1965 to 2005.
Definitions
Following Sudduth (2017), MPD defines military purges as incidents where a dictator elimi-
nates individual members of the elite who have legitimate access to the use of armed forces.
The targets of purges coded in MPD are thus officers in the military or other elements of the
security apparatus and civilian members of the elite at the top of the security apparatus, such
as the defense minister or interior minister. Regarding the manner of elimination, a dictator’s
actions to dismiss, replace, demote, arrest, jail, or kill officers, as well as forced resignations,
are treated as purges in MPD. Finally, we want to distinguish dictators’ actions to expand
their power at the expense of elites from incidents where dictators dismiss officers purely
because of their incompetence or for other nonpolitical/technical reasons. The difficulty is,
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though, that dictators can justify their actions by emphasizing that purged officers were
incompetent or had committed crimes, even when their intention to consolidate their personal
power is clear (a case in point is China’s Xi Jinping). MPD therefore takes an inclusive
approach, that is, it includes all cases where a dictator eliminates officers, but in addition
it codes the background reasons for each case. Users thus can operationalize their purge
variables by focusing only on cases with certain background reasons appropriate for their
studies.
The basic unit of analysis for the MPD dataset is the military purge“event,” such that we
code even those purge incidents that occur within a short period as distinct events when the
background reasons for these purges are different. In addition to the event format dataset, we
provide a panel dataset with a leader-year unit of observation, which, unlike the country-year
format, identifies which leader conducted the purge. Therefore, even when multiple leaders
rule in the same year, MPD precisely assigns each purge event to the appropriate leader. To
identify autocratic countries, we rely on both GWF and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)
(hereafter CGV), such that we code for all the countries that are treated as a non-democracy
by either GWF or CGV. The list of leaders is obtained from Archigos (version 4.1) (Goemans,
Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009).
Coding Procedure
To make the dataset, my research team (research assistants drawn from graduate students at
Emory University and the University of Strathclyde) and I gathered information using (i)
Keesing’s Record of World Events and (ii) Lexis-Nexis news searches. Because of their global
coverage and consistent reporting standards, we decided to use Associated Press, BBC, New
York Times and Washington Post news articles from the Lexis-Nexis database. To search
for relevant articles from the news database, we used several key words that would capture
purge events as defined above. Those words include purge, arrest, dismiss, expel, replace,
remove, reshuffle, sack, and fire. My research team downloaded all hits from the search and
read all the articles to see whether they qualified for coding. Each research assistant read all
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the articles for specific countries and coded all the events from these countries for the relevant
period. This process allowed research assistants to develop country-specific expertise and
improve their interpretation of specific cases. To ensure inter-rater reliability and minimize
the possibility of miscoding, all the events originally coded were reexamined by different
research assistants, and our research team as a whole made a final decision on any cases of
disagreement. All the cases were then reviewed by myself as the project manager. For any
cases I found to be questionable, research assistants searched for additional news articles using
(iii) the Periodicals Archive Online (ProQuest) and (iv) the wider literature on individual
countries. After reviewing the information from the additional search, I made a final decision
on coding.
Variables
In MPD, we include information on the dates and various characteristics of military purges.
The Date variable codes year, month, and day of a specific purge event. Though it is often
difficult to obtain information on the exact day of a purge, for the majority of cases we were
able to capture month-level information.3 We also coded several variables to capture the
nature and characteristics of purges. First, we identify whether a purge was primarily violent
in nature or nonviolent. Violent Purge indicates whether the purge involves the arrest, jailing,
or killing of officers. Nonviolent Purge takes the form of dismissing, demoting, or replacing
officers. Second, we code the background reasons for the purge. Based on our reading of each
case, we code whether a dictator purges the military, for example, (i) to diminish the influence
of a dictator’s political rivals who are popular among other elites and thus are suspected to
be potential threats to his political survival, (ii) to exclude those who have different policy
preferences and criticize the dictator’s policy, (iii) to punish those officers who have planned
to overthrow the leader or the regime, (iv) to punish officers for being incompetent, or (v) to
punish officers who have committed crimes, or (vi) because of pressure from foreign countries.
We also code whether a purge happens in the form of cabinet reshuffles or new government
3For 87 cases among 1,007 purges, the month information is missing.
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formations. Crucially, these categories are not mutually exclusive and a single purge event
can have multiple background reasons. We code these variables so that users can properly
operationalize their purge variables by excluding cases with certain background reasons, or
by including only cases with certain background reasons.
MPD can also differentiate the relative importance of each purge, as it identifies the
positions of purged officers. In the Position variable, we list all the positions targeted in
each purge.4 Based on the information on these purged positions, we then rank purge events
in four categories. The Rank variable identifies whether the targets of a particular purge
include (i) the top-ranking positions, such as the army chief of staff, chief of general staff, the
commander of the army (or navy or air force), or ministerial positions such as the defense
minister or interior minister; (ii) deputies for the top-rank positions, such as deputy chief
of staff or deputy defense minister; (iii) mid-level officers and senior officers, such as the
commander of the regional command, army general or colonel generals; or (iv) junior officers
or soldiers. The Size variable is a four-category measure that indicates whether the number
of purged officers is (i) only one individual, (ii) between 2 and 10, (iii) between 11 and 100,
or (iv) more than 100. We also code whether the target of the purge is an organization: the
Organization Purge captures whether a leader eliminates an entire organization.
Detailed documentation on coding procedures and variables is available in a codebook.
In addition, descriptions of each military purge coded in the dataset and brief discussions of
how we coded it are provided in a case description document (See Online Appendix).
Limitations
Like any data collection efforts that rely on news articles, MPD potentially has reporting bias.
As the news media target a particular audience, their coverage might be biased in favor of
particular countries. In particular, because MPD focuses on authoritarian countries, it might
suffer from underreporting (Salehyan, 2015). Though it is certainly possible that it misses
4Note that these are positions from which officers are purged, and are not always equivalent to the officer’s
specific rank in the military hierarchy.
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some military purge events, there are several reasons to believe that MPD is less subject to
such bias.
First, we gather information from a variety of news sources, including Keesing’s Record
of World Events, Lexis-Nexis news searches and literature on individual countries. Consulting
multiple sources allows us to make the data as comprehensive as possible and to address
the potential biases found in particular sources. Second, as emphasized by Sudduth (2017),
dictators have incentives to make purges public, to credibly signal the cost of disloyalty and
scare off other potentially disloyal elites. Due to their public nature, purges are likely to be
detected and reported by news sources. Relatedly, changes within military organizations
resulting from purges can have important consequences on countries’ military capabilities,
strategies and regional security environments. Because of their security implications for
neighboring countries, military purges tend to draw the attention of foreign media and
governments, which will counter any tendency to underreporting. Third, we dropped from
MPD seven countries where we could not obtain sufficient information to accurately code
purges. Finally, as I will discuss in the following section, the trends in military purges
captured by MPD are consistent with a scholarly understanding of this phenomenon.
It is also important to note that though military purges are crucial in diminishing the
elite’s coup-making capabilities, to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the personal-
ization process, systematic information on “civilian elite” purges is essential. Further, given
recent political trajectories in Hungary, Turkey and the US, another step forward would be
to gather data on purges in democracies.
Descriptive Statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics for MPD. I first examine variations in the incidence
of military purges among different regions and years. For the sake of simplicity, I created
the country-year format data, which codes whether at least one military purge event took
place in a country-year. I identify country-years with autocratic government using GWF,
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and include all military purge events except when an elimination of officers results from the
implementation of a peace agreement.
Figure 1. Number and Probability of Military Purges by Region and Year
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In the upper part of Figure 1, I plot the total number of military purge events per year
in separate panels for different regions. It reveals that the largest number of military purges
occurred in the sub-Saharan African region, while North Africa and the Middle East, and
Asia also witnessed a fairly large number of purges. The lower part of Figure 1 reports the
probability of purge events per country, calculated as the total number of military purges
divided by the number of autocratic countries, for each region-year. It shows that, though
sub-Saharan Africa witnessed the largest number of military purges, the probability that each
autocratic regime experiences at least one purge event in any given year is similar across
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regions as well as across years.5 The average probability of military purges per country-year
is 0.25 in Asia, 0.24 in Eastern and Western Europe, 0.18 in Latin America, 0.25 in North
Africa and the Middle East, and 0.26 in the sub-Saharan African region.
We now explore how the characteristics of individual leaders are correlated with their
tendencies to purge the military. For this exercise, I use the leader-year format of MPD.
Figure 2 presents boxplots of the distributions of the probability of a military purge per year,
calculated for each leader as a unit. Using data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2017, 2018),
I compare four different leader identities prior to their assuming office – i.e. civilian, military,
a rebel leader, or a member of the royal family. For each type of leader, the three boxplots
display the distributions of (i) all types of military purges, (ii) military purges where the
targets include top-ranking positions, and (iii) military purges that involved the arresting,
jailing, or killing of officers. Each panel represents different samples of leaders. The left-hand
panel plots the distribution for all authoritarian leaders, while the middle panel shows the
distributions for those leaders who purged their militaries at least once during their tenure.
The right-hand panel focuses on the sample of leaders who survived more than 10 years.
The left-hand panel in Figure 2 shows that military leaders who were members of the
security apparatus prior to coming to power are more likely to purge the military than other
types of leader, though both civilian and rebel leaders also display a relatively high likelihood
of military purges (around 14 % per year). This tendency also applies to purges that target
top-ranking officers. Second, whereas the majority of leaders never violently purged the
military, there are a few leaders who had frequently conducted violent purges (i.e. there are a
good number of outliers for violent purges). Turning to the middle panel, where we focus on
leaders who purged at least once during their tenure, the variations among different types of
leader considerably diminish. Moreover, all types of leader have relatively high probabilities
of purges (above 0.25 per year on average), implying that leaders who have purged at least
5One exception is the Eastern/Western Europe region in the 2000s, when only Russia and Georgia were
autocratic regimes and both carried out purges. Belarus is coded as authoritarian regime in GWF, but it is
not included in MPD, due to the lack of information.
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once are more likely to purge again.
Figure 2. How Leader Type Is Correlated with the Probability of Military Purges
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Who Survived More than 10 Years
Finally, in the right-hand panel, military and rebel leaders who survived more than 10
years show much higher levels of violent purges than the leaders in other panels. These findings
might suggest that in order to implement violent purges, a leader needs to have already
consolidated enough power. Alternatively, they might reveal a selection effect, such that those
who have abilities to survive long also have abilities to violently purge militaries from the
beginning of tenure. Though descriptive statistics cannot demonstrate causal relationships,
the findings underscore the importance of further work to see how time (tenure) as well as
the type of leader matter in explaining variations in military purges.
Finally, I compare the MPD data with the data on personalist regimes created by
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). The GWF data code whether a specific authoritarian
regime is a personalist, military, or single-party dictatorship. The category of personalist
dictatorship indicates that a high level of concentration of power in the hands of the dictator
is considered to have been achieved in the specific regime. Since a dictator accumulates his
power at the expense of regime elites by repeatedly eliminating strong rivals from the regime
over time (Svolik, 2009; Sudduth, 2017), we should expect that dictators who frequently purge
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Figure 3. The List of Leaders with the Largest Number of Military Purges
Amin UGA
Deng Xiaoping CHN
Hee Park ROK
Mao Tse−Tung CHN
Yeltsin RUS
Biya CAO
Museveni UGA
Nazarbayev KZK
Traore MLI
Vieira GNB
Eyadema TOG
Hassan Al−Bakr IRQ
Mobutu DRC
Siad Barre SOM
Al−Assad H. SYR
Conte GUI
Deby CHA
Stevens SIE
Ben Ali Bourguiba TUN
Sidi Ahmed Taya MAA
Suharto INS
Hussein Ibn Talal El−Hashim JOR
Saddam Hussein IRQ
0 5 10 15
Total Number of Purges
personal military party monarchy
their militaries in MPD should eventually consolidate enough power during their tenure and,
thus, should be coded as personalist in GWF. Figure 3 confirms this point. Figure 3 displays
the list of leaders who had purged their militaries more than seven times during their tenure.
Approximately 50% of leaders who purged their militaries more than seven times are coded
as personalist regimes in GWF. Approximately 55% of those leaders who implemented purges
more than eight times during their tenure are coded as personalist regimes in GWF. This
exercise of comparing MPD and GWF thus gives us confidence that MPD properly captures
a dictator’s efforts to promote the process of personalization of power.
How to Use MPD
In this section, I illustrate a use of MPD by analyzing the impacts of military purges on
the severity of state repression. Dictators face threats not only from within the regime, but
also from outside the regime. To suppress societal dissent and challenge, dictators often
resort to repression, or coercive actions against civilians. To implement repression, however,
dictators must rely on the compliance of members of the security apparatus (e.g. DeMeritt,
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2015; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2017; Dragu and Lupu, 2017; Tyson, 2018). How do dictators’
efforts to consolidate power by repeatedly purging members of the security apparatus affect
security officers’ willingness and ability to comply with the orders and carry out repression?
Theoretically we can think of two competing scenarios. First, military purges might lead
to higher levels of repression because purges allow dictators to “place at the heads of security
organizations loyalists who are more willing to use coercion to keep the regime in power”
(Frantz et al., 2019, p.374). Because the fates of the loyalists are linked with that of the leader
remaining in power, they are more willing to employ violence to protect the regime. They
are also aware that the chances that they themselves will be purged should they disregard
their orders to repress are high (Fruge, 2019). Second, military purges might decrease the
levels of repression. Frequent purges prevent officers from developing the leadership skills
and establishing the cohesive ties with their troops and personnel (Brooks, 1998; Powell,
2015; Sudduth, 2016; Narang and Talmadge, 2018) that are required to achieve successful
coordinated actions in implementing repression. Moreover, purges would increase grievances
among military officers, making them increasingly refuse to obey the leader’s orders to repress,
or even making them more likely todefect from the regime (Brooks, 2013; Gaub, 2013).
Using MPD, I am able to evaluate these competing hypotheses. Our sample consists
of the 108 authoritarian countries over the years 1965-2005, with the country-year unit-of-
analysis. Using MPD, I create several binary variables that capture whether (a) all types of
military purges, (b) violent purges, (c) purges where the targets include top-ranking positions,
and (d) large-scale purges where the number of purged officers is more than 100, occur at
least once in the last five years for each country-year. Following Sudduth (2017), I focus on
military purges that occur for political reasons, and exclude cases where a dictator eliminates
officers because they were incompetent or committed crimes.
To measure the severity of repression, I use the number of civilians killed intentionally
by government armed forces, taken from the UCDP One-Sided Violence (OSV) Dataset
Version 19.1 (Eck and Hultman, 2007). Though there are a number of existing datasets on
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state repression, many of them count dictators’ acts against members of the security forces
as state repression.6 I use OSV data because it clearly defines the target of repression as
unarmed civilians who are “not active members of the security forces of the state” and also
excludes cases where the targets of state violence are government officials (Pettersson, 2019,
p.3). OSV data include cases where at least 25 civilians are killed per government-year, and
report fatality estimates for these cases.
Since my dependent variable (the number of civilians killed by government forces per
country-year) exhibits over-dispersion as well as an excess number of zeros, I use zero-inflated
negative binomial models with country random effects, estimated via the glmmTMB package
in R. In all the models reported below, I control for GDP per capita, population size, civil
war, the lag of the dependent variables in both the count components and zero-inflated
components, and civilian leader, military leader, support party and leader tenure in the count
components. Due to the space limitation, I discuss the data sources of these variables in the
Appendix.
The left-hand panel in Figure 4 plots the coefficient estimates of the count components,
reporting the effects of different types of military purges on the number of civilian fatalities,
with 95% confidence intervals. It demonstrates that a large-scale purge variable has a negative
and statistically significant effect on the number of civilian fatalities (Model 4), while the
effects of other types of purges are insignificant. Model 5 confirms that the coefficient on the
number of large-scale purge events (a non-binary variable) is also negative and statistically
significant. The right-hand panel in Figure 4 plots the coefficient estimates of Model 4. It
shows that though large-scale purges are associated with lower levels of repression, they do
not have significant impacts on the occurrence of repression. The coefficient on large-scale
purge in the zero-inflated part is insignificant. In the Appendix, I demonstrate that the
empirical inferences hold with additional control variables such as civilian killings by non-
government groups, International Criminal Court (ICC) ratification, ethnic exclusion, violent
6Fariss (2014) overviews repression data sources.
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Figure 4. Effects of Military Purges on the Number of Civilians Killed by Governments
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and nonviolent protests and personalism.
Using MPD, I examine the impact of military purges on the severity of state repression,
assessing competing hypotheses suggested in the literature. The findings reveal that (i)
dictators’ efforts to consolidate power by purging their security apparatus will reduce, not
increase, the severity of repression, measured by the number of civilians killed by the
government. Moreover, (ii) purges have significant impacts only when they target a large
number of military officers. Though the finding that the size of purges matters might not
sound surprising, it indicates that the key agents that channel dictators’ actions toward
militaries to the level of state repression are middle- and lower-ranked officers, rather than
top-ranking members of the security apparatus. In large-scale purges, defined as those with
more than 100 individuals targeted, coded in MPD, the majority of victims are the middle-
and low-ranked officers, simply because there are not so many top-ranked positions to be
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purged. A detailed assessment of the causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this article,
but these findings underscore the importance of further work to disaggregate types of military
purges in analyzing their causes and consequences.
Conclusion
MPD contributes to the literature on political violence and comparative authoritarianism.
Though many studies have examined how political authorities repress citizens’ capabilities to
challenge them, we know very little about when leaders repress regime elites (especially the
military) who are the key agents of the state repression of citizens. Using MPD, this paper
demonstrates that purges of members of the security apparatus reduce the regime’s ability
and willingness to repress civilians. Further, MPD allows researchers to explore the dynamics
of consolidation of power in dictatorships. Though a global rise of personalist dictatorships
and its implications for global stability have been highlighted (e.g. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz
and Wright, 2017; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor., 2017; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018), we
hitherto lacked a systematic dataset that captures the timing of when dictators take steps to
promote the concentration of power at the expense of the elite. By providing such information,
MPD will illuminate the dynamics behind a global rise of personalism, a concerning trend in
the post-Cold War era.
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A-3
2 
 
  
General Description:  
o The MPD dataset contains information on the timings and characteristics of military 
purge events in dictatorships from 1965 to 2005. MPD contains 1,007 military 
purge cases and codes for 566 political leaders in 116 autocratic countries.    
 
o The MPD dataset comes with two formats – (a) the event data format and (b) the 
leader-year panel format dataset.  
 
o To create MPD, we gathered information using (i) Keesing Record of World Events 
and (ii) Lexis-Nexis news searches (Associated Press, BBC, New York Times and 
Washington Post). For cases in which we need additional information, we also 
consult with (iii) Periodicals Archive Online (ProQuest) and (iv) literatures on 
individual countries.  
 
Theoretical Background: 
o In dictatorships, the mechanisms of political accountability and power dynamics    
are ultimately backed by a credible threat of a coup d’état -- an attempt by regime 
elites to remove political leaders using unconstitutional/violent means--, even when 
nominally democratic institutions such as parties and legislatures exist (Svolik 
2009). A dictator’s decision-making and behaviours are constrained to the extent 
that regime elites can credibly threaten the use of force and deter the dictator’s 
opportunism. Elites’ abilities to successfully oust a dictator using violence thus 
define their bargaining power and abilities to hold him accountable.  
 
o Though many authoritarian leaders face powerful regime elites who are willing and 
able to remove leaders via coup, some dictators have successfully eliminated 
enough rival elites from key positions so that they no longer face powerful 
audiences who can credibly threaten to stage a coup. Without having strong elites to 
hold them accountable, these dictators – typically called personalist dictators -- are 
found to be more likely to initiate a costly international conflict and invest in 
nuclear weapons than political leaders in other forms of autocracies or democracies 
(Weeks 2008, 2012).    
 
Definition:  
o Our primary interest in this project is to identify cases in which a dictator purges 
their militaries. We define military purges as incidents where a dictator eliminates 
individual elites who have legitimate access to the use of armed forces.  
 
o Target of elimination: The MPD data focus on individuals who have legitimate 
access to physical forces capable of violence. They thus include (1) military officers 
in the military or other security apparatus (including the army, navy, air force, 
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police force and paramilitary), and (2) civilian elites that are at the top of the 
security apparatus such as the defence minister or interior minister.  
 
We focus on purges of members in the military and other security apparatus because 
these officers are most critical in organizing a coup. Although the initial stage of 
coup attempts frequently involves civilian elites alone, whether these civilian coup-
plotters can successfully replace the incumbent leader crucially depends on whether 
they can gain (at least implicitly) support from the military or other security 
apparatus. Thus eliminations of elites that have access to physical forces - officers 
in the military or other security apparatus and civilian elites that are at the top of the 
security apparatus such as the defence minister or interior minister - are considered 
to be the most crucial in reducing the elites’ capabilities to successfully oust a 
dictator and hold him accountable.   
  
 
o Manner of elimination: We focus on cases in which autocratic leaders force 
individuals out of their positions. Thus, a dictator’s action to dismiss, replace, 
demote, arrest, jail or kill officers, as well as forced resignations are coded as 
purges.  
 
o Dictators’ motivations behind elimination:  We want to distinguish dictators’ 
actions to expand their power at the expense of elites from incidents where dictators 
dismiss officers purely because of their incompetence or other non-
political/technical reasons. The difficulty is, though, that dictators can justify their 
actions by emphasizing that purged officers were incompetent or had committed 
crimes, even when their intention to consolidate their personal power is clear (a case 
in point is China’s Xi Jinping). MPD therefore takes an inclusive approach, that is, 
it includes all cases where a dictator eliminates officers, but in addition it codes the 
dictator’s motivations (i.e. background reasons) for each case.  Users thus can 
operationalize their purge variables by focusing only on cases with certain 
background reasons appropriate for their studies.   
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Even Format Dataset:  
This dataset contains 1,007 military purge events and their data and characteristics 
information. The unit of observation is an event.  
 
Variables:   
obsid:  A unique ID for each leader (taken from Archigos 4.1)  
 
year: The year of the purge event 
 
month: The month of the purge event  
 
day: The day of the purge event  
                    
multievent:      Coded 1 if the same leader-year observes multiple purge events, and 0 otherwise.       
 
ccode:        Correlates of War country code 
 
idacr:  The abbreviation of country names   
 
leader:       Name of Political Leader  
 
 
Purge Variables : 
 
purge:  Coded 1 if a purge occurs (i.e. all the observations are coded as 1 in the event dataset.) 
 
violent_purge :    Coded 1 if a purge involves arresting, jailing or killing of officers, and coded 0 otherwise. 
  
 
Ranks of Purged Officers:  
top_officer_event:  
            Coded 1 if targets of a purge include the top-ranking positions such as the army chief of staff, chief of ge
neral staff, commander of the army (or navy or air force), or ministerial positions such as the defense minister or 
interior minister. 
   
deputy_officer_event:   
              Coded 1 if the targets of a purge include the deputies for the top-rank positions such as deputy chief of 
staff or deputy defense minister.  
 
high_officer_event:  
                 Coded 1 if the targets of a purge include mid-level officers and senior officers such as the commander 
of the regional command, army general or colonel generals.  
 
low_officer_event:   
                 Coded 1 if the targets of a purge include junior officers or soldiers. 
 
rank_officer_event:  
            This is an aggregated categorical variable and captures whether the highest-ranked target of a purge is 
(a) the top-ranked officers (“top-rank officers purged”), (b) high-ranked officers (“high-rank officers purged”), o
r (c) only low-ranked officers (“low-rank officers purged”).  Specifically, if either “top_officer_event” or “deput
y_officer_event” is coded as 1, this variable is coded as “top-rank officers purged.”  If “high_officer_event” is co
ded as 1, but neither “top_officer_event” nor “deputy_officer_event” is coded as 1, this variable is coded as “hig
h-rank officers purged”. Finally, if only “low_officer_event” is coded as 1, this variable is coded as “low-rank of
ficers purged.”   
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Positions of Purged Officers  
 
position_year:  
            
       This variable lists all the positions targeted by purges in a particular leader-year (This is not an event-specifi
c variable. We list all the positions targeted in the same leader-year and thus it can include multiple purges.)  
  
 
Size of Purges  
size_purge_event:  
     Coded to capture whether the number of purged officers is (a) only one individual (“One officer”, (b) betwee
n 2 and 10 (“less than 10”), (c) between 11 and 100 (“less than 100”), or (iv) more than 100 (“more than 100”).    
 
 organization_purge_event:  
       Coded 1 if the target of the purge is the entire organization.  
 
 
 
Background Reasons of Purges  
    We create several variables that capture the background reasons or a dictator’s motivation behind purges. The
se categories are not mutually exclusive and thus a single purge case can have multiple reasons.  
 
 
anti_previousgov_event 
    Coded 1 if the purpose of the purge is to diminish the influences of the previous leader/government. A dictator 
excludes or demotes those officers who are close to the previous leader/government. Coded 0 otherwise.  
anti_rivals_event:  
        Coded 1 if the purpose of the purge is to diminish the influences of a dictator’s rivals. This includes a purge 
of individuals who are popular among other elites, are considered potential successors, or those individuals who 
are closely connected to, or are loyal to the dictator’s rivals. Cases where a dictator replaces them with those 
officers who are more loyal to the dictator, or takes these positions by himself are included in this category.  
ethnic_purge_event:  
          Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates officers based on their ethnicity.  
 obtainposition_event:  
          Coded 1 if a dictator purges individuals and takes their positions by himself.  
 policydifference_event:  
              Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates individuals due to the policy differences they have. This category 
includes cases where a dictator excludes officers who have policy preferences different from the dictator’s, who 
criticized or challenged the dictator’s policies, or who refused to implement the dictator’s policy orders. We use 
the term policy very broadly here and include purges based on differences in political philosophy in this 
category (such as anti-communist purges).   
 
cabinetreshuffle_event:  
          Coded 1 if a leader eliminates individuals via cabinet reshuffle, and the security-related portfolios are 
affected by the cabinet shuffle.  There are several criteria to code this variable. First, to code this variable as 1, 
there is at least one individual who previously held the security-related portfolio and lost the portfolio, or who 
was assigned to a clearly lower-ranked portfolio via the cabinet reshuffle. Second, if the individual who 
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previously held the security related portfolio (Minister) is assigned to a different but similarly important 
portfolio (Minister) in the cabinet, we do NOT code this event as a purge. However, as an exception to the above 
criteria, we code this variable as 1 if an individual who had previously held multiple portfolios lost some of 
these positions including security–related positions and still remained in the cabinet with a smaller number of 
positions, as a consequence of the cabinet reshuffle. If there is a clear indication that the cabinet members agree 
to resign and then a new cabinet is formed, we do not code the event as a cabinet reshuffle purge.  
 
international_purge_event:  
       Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates officers due to political pressures from the international community or 
foreign countries. This includes cases where a dictator eliminates military officers in the process of 
implementing the peace agreement with former rebels.  
 
threat_rumor_event:  
         Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates officers who reportedly planned to challenge him (via coup or 
assassination). This includes cases where a leader dismisses officers because the leader fears a potential coup.  
Note that this event refers to coup rumours. We do not include post-failed coup punishments in this category. 
 
failedcoup_purge_event:  
         Coded 1 for cases where a purge happens after the attempt to challenge a dictator or the regime fails. In 
these events, dictators purge and punish officers who plotted or participated in a (failed) coup or a military 
rebellion, or those who are related to the coup plotters.   
 
rebel_purge_event:  
         Coded 1 if a dictator purges officers who cooperated with rebel groups or opposition groups to challenge t
he government/dictator.  
 
 
civilcontrol_purge_event:  
              Coded 1 if the purpose of purges is to promote the civilian control of the military.  Purges are meant to 
reduce the military’s influences on politics.  
 
 
incompetence_purge_event:  
              Coded 1 if a dictator purges officers due to their incompetence, poor performances, failures in impleme
nting strategies or achieving policy goals and negligence.  
 
 
crimepunish_purge_event:  
                   Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates officers to punish them for the crimes they had committed (such as b
ribery, smuggling and violations of citizens’ human rights etc.).  
  
 
newgovern_purge_event:  
                Coded 1 if a dictator eliminates individuals who had positions in the previous government, from the 
new government s/he organizes.  
     
noinfo_reason_event:  
               Coded 1 if there is no information to code specific reasons behind purges.  
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Types of Purges    
  We create several variables to capture different types of military purges. These variables build on our coding of   
the background reasons for purges discussed above.  
 
 purge_sub1:    
              Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “international_purge_event” is coded as 1.   
 
purge_sub2:  
              Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “incompetence_purge_event” or “crimepunish_purge_event” 
are coded as 1.  
 
purge_sub3:  
 
               Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “newgovern_purge_event” is coded as 1.  
 
purge_sub4 :  
               Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “failedcoup_purge_event” or “rebel_purge_event” is coded 
1. 
 
purge_sub5:  
               Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “noinfo_reason_event” is coded as 1.  
 
purge_sub6:  
               Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “anti_previousgov_event” is coded as 1.  
 
purge_sub7:  
                Coded 1 for all purges except cases where “international_purge_event” , “incompetence_purge_even
t”, “crimepunish_purge_event”, or “noinfo_reason_event” is coded as 1.  
 
purge_sub8  :  
               Coded 1 for purge events where at least one of the following variables is coded as 1. “anti_rivals_even
t”, “policydifference_event”, “threat_rumor_event”, “anti_previousgov_event”, “ethnic_purge_event”, “obtainp
osition_event”, “failedcoup_purge_event”, “rebel_purge_event”, “civilcontrol_purge_event”, “cabinetreshffle_e
vent”, “newgovern_purge_event”. 
 
purge_sub9 :  
                                 
            Equivalent to “purge_sub8” except that “newgovern_purge_event” is not included in the criteria (i.e. 
Whether “newgovern_purge_event” is coded as 1 is not relevant in creating this variable.)   
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Leader-Year Format Dataset  
 
This dataset has leader-year unit of observations and includes 566 political leaders for 116 authoritarian countrie
s from 1965 to 2005.  
 
obsid:  
     A unique ID for leaders taken from Archigos 4.1  
 
year:  
      Calendar year 
 
ccode 
      COW’s country code  
 
tenure:  
       Tenure in years.   
 
leader:      
       Leader names   
 
  
Start dates and End dates of Tenure  
The variables on start dates and end dates of tenure are taken from Archigos 4.1. However, we had changed the 
codings for Syria’s Al-Jadid and Al-Assad tenure so that we can reflect the fact that the effective power shifted f
rom Al-Jadid to Assad after February 26, 1969 coup.  
  
 
syear:  
       Start year of a leader’s tenure.  
                   
smonth:  
       Start month of a leader’s tenure 
 
sday:                    
         Start day of a leader’s tenure  
 
eyear:  
        End year of a leader’s tenure  
 
emonth:  
      End month of a leader’s tenure. 
 
eday:  
       End day of a leader’s tenure.  
  
 
transleader:  
           Coded 1 for those leaders who are in power in the transition year (i.e. multiple-leaders in the same year). 
       
 
 
GWF regime type  
The following variables are from GWF and identify different types of autocratic regimes. Note that though both 
GWF and CGV are country-year, I assigned proper regime types for each dictator in transition years (i.e. multipl
e leaders/regime types exist in the same year.) 
 
gwf_party  
gwf_military  
gwf_monarchy 
gwf_personal 
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gwf_nonautocracy 
 
 
CGV regime types:  
       The following variables are taken from CGV and identify regime types. Note that though both GWF and C
GV are country-year formats, I assigned proper regime types for each dictator in transition years (i.e. multiple le
aders/regime types exist in the same year.) 
      
cgv_regime 
cgv_democracy 
cgv_gwf_democracy"      
 
 
 
Purge Variables:  
 
The following variables are binary variables to capture whether a certain type of military purges occur in a leade
r-year. For the definitions of each type of military purge (i.e. sub1 v.s. sub2), see the descriptions of the event da
taset. 
 
purge_sub1_year:  
purge_sub2_year:  
purge_sub3_year:  
purge_sub4_year:  
purge_sub5_year:  
purge_sub6_year:  
purge_sub7_year:  
purge_sub8_year:  
purge_sub9_year:   
 
 
The following variables are binary variables to capture whether a certain type of violent purge occurs in a leader
-year. Violent purges involve arresting, jailing and killing of officers. For the definitions of each type of military 
purge (i.e. sub1 v.s. sub2), see the descriptions of the event dataset. 
 
violentpurge_p1_year 
violentpurge_p2_year 
violentpurge_p3_year 
violentpurge_p4_year 
violentpurge_p5_year 
violentpurge_p6_year 
violentpurge_p7_year 
violentpurge_p8_year 
violentpurge_p9_year  
 
 
The following variables are binary variables that capture whether a certain type of nonviolent purge occurs in a l
eader-year. For the definitions of each type of military purges (i.e. sub1 v.s. sub2), see the descriptions of the ev
ent dataset. 
 
peacepurge_p1_year 
peacepurge_p2_year 
peacepurge_p3_year 
peacepurge_p4_year 
peacepurge_p5_year 
peacepurge_p6_year 
peacepurge_p7_year 
peacepurge_p8_year 
peacepurge_p9_year  
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The following variables are binary variables to identify whether the targets of purges include top-ranked officers 
(“top_officer_p1”), deputies for the top-rank positions (“deputy_officer_p1”), high-ranked officers (“high_offic
er_p1”), or low-ranked officers (“low_officer_p1”). # indicates the types of military purges (See above for the d
efinitions of each type of purges). 
 
top_officer_p#   
deputy_officer_p#             
high_officer_p# 
low_officer_p#  
 
The following variables are binary variables to identify whether the targets of nonviolent purges include top-ran
ked officers (“top_officer_p1”), deputies for the top-rank positions (“deputy_officer_p1”), high-ranked officers 
(“high_officer_p1”), or low-ranked officers (“low_officer_p1”). # indicates the types of military purges (See ab
ove for the definitions of each type of purges). 
 
peacepurge_p#_top_officer 
peacepurge_p#_deputy_officer 
peacepurge_p#_high_officer 
peacepurge_p#_low_officer 
 
 
The following variables are binary variables to identify whether the targets of violent purges include top-ranked 
officers (“top_officer_p1”), deputies for the top-rank positions (“deputy_officer_p1”), high-ranked officers (“hi
gh_officer_p1”), or low-ranked officers (“low_officer_p1”). # indicates the types of military purges (See above 
for the definitions of each type of purges). 
 
violentpurge_p#_year 
violentpurge_p#_deputy_officer 
violentpurge_p#_high_officer 
violentpurge_p#_low_officer 
 
 
The following are aggregated categorical variables that capture the ranks of purge officers/positions. Specificall
y, the variable identifies whether the highest-ranked positions of the target officers include (a) the top-ranked off
icers (“top-rank officers purged”), (b) high-ranked officers (“high-rank officers purged”), or (c) only low-ranked 
officers (“low-rank officers purged”).  # indicates the types of military purges (See above for the definitions of e
ach type of purges). 
 
rank_officer_purge#   
rank_violentpurge#  
rank_peacepurge#  
 
 
    The following variables capture whether the number of purged officers is (a) only one individual (“One office
r”, (b) between 2 and 10 (“less than 10”), (c) between 11 and 100 (“less than 100”), or (iv)  more than 100 (“mor
e than 100”).  # indicates the types of military purges (See above for the definitions of each type of purges). 
 
size_purge#  
size_violent_purge# 
size_peace_purge#  
 
The following variables code whether the purge eliminates the entire organization or not.  
 
organization_purge#   
organization_violent_purge#  
organization_peace_purge#  
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 position_year:  
    This variable lists the names of all the positions affected by purge event in a certain year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 Case Descriptions
Upon publication of this article, I will release a case description document that provides
brief narratives of cases for each leader-year included in our dataset. In this document,
coders briefly provide narratives of military purges observed for each leader-year, explain their
coding decisions and report the news sources. The entire case description document currently
consists of 291 pages. In this section, I provide a few of these narratives as examples.
Example Narratives from the Case Description Document
1970 Bolivia BOL Ovando Candia
In a move to forestall left-wing factions within the armed forces from taking power, General
Ovando reorganized the High Command of the Bolivian military, and removed General Torres,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Ovando himself took charge of a newly formed
Supreme Council that oversaw the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches of the military.
A peaceful purge of one top officer, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was recorded for
1970. The reason for this purge was coded as the leader obtaining a position by himself, and
as spurred by anti-regime activities (rumors of a coup plot by left-wing officers).
Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 17, May, 1971 Bolivia, Page 24573.
1971 Bolivia BOL Torres
President Torres removed several high-ranking officers with right-wing sentiments that sup-
ported a rival, General Miranda. Among the removed officers were Colonel Adet Zamora
and Colonel Juan Miguel Ayoroa. Ayoroa was General Ovanda’s (mentioned above, 1969
and 1970) Interior Minister. A peaceful purge of several high-ranking senior officers was
recorded for Torres in 1971. The reasons for this purge were coded as anti-previous govern-
ment, as a policy difference, and getting rid of officers connected to a popular or powerful figure.
Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 17, May, 1971 Bolivia, Page 24575.
1971 Bolivia BOL Banzer Suarez
In a cabinet reshuffle, President Banzer removed his Interior Minister, Colonel Andres
Selich and replaced him with Colonel Mario Adett Zamora. Selich was a powerful and
important member of the regime that had played a key role in bringing the president to
power. A peaceful purge of one top officer, the Interior Minister was coded for 1971 under
President Banzer as part of a cabinet reshuffle.
A-14
Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 18, February, 1972 Bolivia, Page 25124.
1997 Jordan JOR Hussein Ibn Talal El-Hashim
As a result of strong differences over the country’s domestic policies and stance toward
Israel, Hussein dismissed his premier and Defense Minister, Abdul- Karim Kabariti, appointed
just a year earlier, and replaced him with Abdel-Salam al-Majali. A new Interior Minister
was named as well as part of the new government.
A peaceful purge of several top officers, the Defense and Interior Ministers was recorded as a
result of policy differences and the formation of a new government.
Source: Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume 43, March, 1997 Jordan, Page 41566.
1999 Jordan JOR Abdullah Ibn Hussein El-Hashimi
A large purge of the Jordanian armed forces was conducted after the late King Hussein had
surprisingly named his oldest son as his successor in place of his brother Hassan Bin Talal.
The latter was accused of corruption and attempts to replace senior military officers with
people loyal to him, as well as securing the support of other officers in return for promises of
quick promotions. In total, some 92 junior and senior officers suspected to be loyal to crown
prince Hassan were removed from the armed forces, including the Deputy Chief of the Army
Staff, Lieutenant General Tahsin Shurdum. The new king Abdullah II replaced the Chief of
Staff, Field Marshal Abdul Hafez Murei Kaabneh with General Mohammed Malkawi, and
forcibly retired three other army generals; General Id Kamil al-Radwan, General Hamzah
al-Azab, and General Mahmud Fihad.
A peaceful purge of less than 100 military officers is recorded for 1999. A purged top
officer was the Chief of Staff (this is currently called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces). Purged high-ranking officers include the Deputy Chief
of Staff (coded as “Deputy Chief of Army Staff”), several army generals, senior and junior
officers. The reasons for the purge were coded as: removing a popular figure, removing those
loyal to a popular figure and anti-regime actions or coup plots.
Sources: The Associated Press, July 18, 1999; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 4,
1999; and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 24, 1999. Wiki: Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces.
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A.3 Countries Dropped from MPD
We dropped from MPD those countries where we could not obtain sufficient information to
accurately code purges. These countries are North Korea, Libya, East Germany, Mongolia,
Belarus, Cyprus, and Bosnia and Helzegovina. Given that we dropped only seven countries,
it is very unlikely that it will introduce biases in the empirical analyses.
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A.4 Main Results
This section provides more detailed information on statistical analyses and results reported
in the main text.
• Repression Data (Dependent Variable)
– In terms of my dependent variable (the severity of state repression), as I maintain
in the main text, I use OSV data because it clearly defines the target of repression
as unarmed civilians who are “not active members of the security forces of the
state” and also excludes cases where the targets of state violence are government
officials (Pettersson, 2019, pp.3).
– As I mentioned in the main text, many state repression datasets count dictators’
acts against members of the security forces as state repression.1 For example,
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) data by Marshall, Gurr and Harff (2018)
include large-scale military purge incidents as genocide or politicide cases.
– More generally, repression literature defines repression as “violations of physical
integrity rights” that are inflicted by “political authorities against those under
their jurisdiction” (Fariss, 2014, p.297). And, thus, it does not differentiate
whether the targets/victims of repression are regime insiders (i.e. members of the
government/regime including members of the repressive apparatus), or civilians.
For example, the CIRI Physical Integrity data created by Cingranelli and Richards.
(1999) define extrajudicial killings as “killings by government officials without due
process of law” and a victim is “someone who was killed by a government or its
agents as a result of his or her involvement in political activities or for supporting
(implicitly or explicitly) the political actions of opposition movements against the
existing government (Cingranelli and Richards, 2014, p.7)”. This definition thus
does not exclude cases where dictators violently purge members of the security
1See Fariss (2014) for the list of these data sources.
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apparatus who are unhappy about incumbent leaders and are suspected to support
the movement against the regime/dictators.
– Using these repression data sources in my analysis would be problematic as we
would count the cases where dictators arrest, jail or kill military officers as both
military purge incidents as well as repression incidents, which in turn leads to
incorrect inferences that military purges have positive effects on repression of
civilians.
• Control Variable Sources
– Data for variables come from the GWF data for the military leader and civilian
leader variables, that capture leader identities prior to their assuming office (the
base category includes both rebel leaders and a member of the royal family),
the support party variable, and the leader tenure variable (logged), the PRIO
(Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008) for the civil war
variable, the Penn World Tables, version 9.0 from Feenstra and Timmer (2015) for
the GDP/capita (logged) and the population (logged) variables.
– In terms of the lagged dependent variables, the number of civilian casualties in the
previous year (logged) is included in the count component, and a binary variable
of whether civilian killings by the government (i.e. defined as one with at least
more than 25 deaths) occurred in the previous year is included in the zero-inflated
part.
• Model Selections
– Since my dependent variable exhibits clear over-dispersion (the mean of the DV
is 172, while its sd is 8,812) as well as an excess number of zeros (the number of
zeros is 3094, while non-zero positive is 126), I use zero-inflated negative binomial
models with country random effects, estimated via the glmmTMB package in R.
A-18
Zero-inflated models have two components – the count component that explains the
number of civilian killed by the government-year, and the zero-inflated component
that estimates whether country-years are unlikely to observe the occurrence of
civilian killing by the government.
– Table A1 compares various model specifications using Model 4 in the main text
(i.e. the model with a binary large-scale purge variable). Table A1 reveals that a
zero-inflated negative binomial model enormously improves the fit, in comparison
to alternative approaches such as a negative binomial model and a zero-inflated
model with the poisson link. I also confirmed that adding more control variables
(i.e. including all the control variables utilized in the count component) in the
zero-inflated component diminishes the model fit.
• Results
– Figure A1 provides the coefficient estimates of Models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 discussed
in the main text. As I mentioned in the main text, large-scale purge variables
have negative and significant effects on the number of civilians killed by the
government, while other types of purges do not have significant effects. In terms
of the occurrence of civilian killings, defined as one with at least 25 civilian deaths
per country-year in OSV data, none of purge variables have significant effects.
– The magnitude of the effects of large-scale purges is also large enough to be
meaningful. Holding other variables constant at their means or medians, an
increase in a binary large-scale purge variable from zero to one reduces the
predicted number of civilian casualties in state repression by one-third from 213
to 70.
– The results on control variables are consistent with the literature’s understanding.
For example, a better economy will reduce the number of civilians killed by the
government as well as the likelihood of occurrence of civilian killing. Both the
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occurrences of civilian killing by the government as well as the severity of civilian
killing are higher during ongoing civil war.
Table A1. Model Fits
Model AIC BIC N
Negative Binomial 2363.92 2433.39 2413
Zero-inflated Poisson 69794.15 69898.34 2413
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 2083.20 2193.19 2413
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 2084.23 2217.37 2413
with more ZI parameters
Note: I compare different model specifications in evaluating the effects of Large-Scale Purge
on the severity of repression. A zero-inflated negative binomial model reported here is identical
to Model 4 in Figure 4 reported in the main text.
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Figure A1. Coefficient Estimate (Models in the Main Text)
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A.5 Robustness Test
In this section, I show that the empirical inferences reported in the main text hold with addi-
tional control variables such as civilian killings by non-government groups, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) ratification, ethnic exclusion, violent and nonviolent protest and latent
personalism.
• Variable Sources
– Data sources are Chapman and Chaudoin (2013) and Jo and Simmons (2016) for
the International Criminal Court (ICC) ratification variable (whether a country-
year has ratified the ICC Rome Statute), OSV data for the binary rebel violence
variable that indicates whether civilian killing by non-government actors occurs in
a country-year, NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) for the violent
and nonviolent protest variables (the binary variables that indicate whether such
protest occur in a country-year), the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset version
3.0 (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009) for the ethnic exclusion variable (the
percentage of a country’s population excluded from state power), and Frantz et al.
(2019) for the latent personalism variable.
• Results
– I report the results with a binary large-scale purge variable in Figure A2 and the
results with a count purge variable that measures how many large-scale purge
incidents occur in the previous 5 years in Figure A3.
– Consistent with the results reported in the main text, the results here show that
large-scale purges reduce the number of civilians killed by the government.
– The majority of the additional control variables do not have significant impacts
on the count of civilian fatalities. One exception is a latent personalism measure,
which is negative and statistically significant, though the uncertainty is quite large.
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Figure A2. Results with More Control Variables (IV: Binary Large-Scale Purge Variable)
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Figure A3. Results with More Control Variables (IV: Non-Binary Large-Scale Purge Variable)
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